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Recent bank failures highlight the topicality and importance of the book. Jean-
Charles Rochet, a leading expert in the field of banking, presents ten of his articles
published in scientific journals between 1996 and 2004. The book provides an excel-
lent introduction to the theory of banking regulation. The author analyzes the mech-
anisms of banking regulation and his suggestions to improve the existing system.
A drawback of the book is that it does not investigate how information asymmetries
in the banking system can be reduced. However, the author acknowledges their role
for distressed banks.
The book is organized in an introduction and four parts. The first part, which shares
the book’s title, introduces the sources of bank fragility, the fractional reserve system
and the resulting risk of bank runs. The three regulatory channels on how to stabilize
the system are then introduced and are the topics of the subsequent parts. These are:
The Lender of Last Resort (Part Two) and Solvency Regulations (Part Four). In line
with the academic literature, the author suggests using financial markets to assess and
ensure the solvency of banks. In particular, the use of private ratings and the idea to
force banks to issue subordinated debt are discussed. This is the topic of the Third
Part of the book, Prudential Regulation and the Management of Systemic Risk.
The task of The Lender of Last Resort (LLR) is to lend to solvent but illiquid
banks, for example in case of a mismatch of the assets’ and liabilities’ maturity. In
the first article of this section, the author provides a rationale for the existence of an
LLR, even when there is solvency and liquidity regulation and a developed interbank
lending market. This is because investors in this market can fail to coordinate, and
necessary solvency and liquidity requirements would be too costly. The LLR, how-
ever, should only be one part of a regulatory system and has to be complemented
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with provisions for the prompt and orderly resolution of the crisis. If there is an LLR
in the market, it faces two main problems: first, it is difficult to distinguish between
illiquid and insolvent banks, and second, moral hazard and gambling for resurrection
can affect the behavior of distressed banks. These two problems are analyzed in the
second presented article and policy implications and mechanisms for design of the
LLR and its interplay with interbank markets and supervisors are derived.
The four articles in the next part deal with Prudential Regulation and the Man-
agement of Systemic Risk. While the interest rates’ interbank lending market should
impose the market discipline, the existence of an LLR can lead to a failure of market
discipline because intervention could be anticipated. In the first article, the authors
show that this is indeed the case. However, they find that independent banking su-
pervisors are more important than market information for regulatory purposes. The
importance of interbank payment systems for systematic risk and protecting the LLR
against undesired intervention is shown in the next article. The author shows how
peer-monitoring can work and how interbank loans should be structured for it to
work. In the next article the design of the interbank payment system is studied. Such
a system should be tractable, traceable, and induce low systematic risk. It should also
be smoothly running, be affordable, and generate reliable information on bank sol-
vency. Net and gross payment systems as well as mixed ones are able to fulfill these
requirements depending on who pays in the case of failure, who monitors, and who
has the power to intervene. It is particularly important to account for the fact that illiq-
uidity and insolvency cannot be separated. The authors suggest improving regulatory
systems through modifications of debit caps and overdraft facilities, and by central-
izing all credit lines and transactions in a gross system for monitoring purposes. The
resiliency of the banking system in general is investigated in the last article in this
Part. It is shown that the interbank market leads to a minimization of total system
required liquidity. This benefit comes at a cost: it can come to excessive liquidation
of investments if there are large unexpected withdrawals and insolvent banks are sub-
sidized through the system. A set of policy implications is derived. Interestingly, the
authors find the interbank payment system structure to be determined by the structure
of the interbank lending market, because of incomplete information.
Solvency Regulations is the topic of the last Part. First, capital regulations similar
to Basel I are studied in both complete and incomplete markets. The author shows
that this regulation can actually lead to increased risk taking by banks and not to a
reduction of the chance of failure. Market based risk weights and actuarial premiums
for deposit insurance are suggested to fix this problem. Basel II is studied in the next
chapter. In a formal model, the authors investigate the interaction between capital reg-
ulation, supervisory review, and market discipline. Direct market discipline through
the issuance of subordinated debt is shown to provide meaningful information about
a bank’s solvency. Moreover, it can be an important complement for supervisory ac-
tion. Thus, keeping close relationship with banks and market discipline should be in
the focus of supervisors and not the complexification of risk-based capital require-
ments. The final chapter of this Part analyzes the three pillars of Basel II. In a simple
dynamic model, the previous chapters’ findings are refined: political interference and
erratic market prices in periods of crisis can affect the stability of the system nega-
tively. Thus, the supervisory system should be reformed to guarantee independence
and prudential action in future crises.
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Summarizing, I can recommend the book to anyone interested in a formal, acad-
emic approach to banking regulation. The concise conclusions of the individual arti-
cles provide valuable ideas for changes in banking regulation.
Jean-Charles Rochet is a Professor of Mathematics and Economics at the Univer-
sity of Toulouse and a visiting professor at the London School of Economics and
Political Science. His books include (with Xavier Freixas) Microeconomics of Bank-
ing and (with Guillaume Plantin) When Insurers Go Bust (Princeton).
